Garden Hose

Deep in Arctic waters near the Svalbard archipelago this spring, NATO allies caught Russian submarines training to deploy a secret weapon designed to disable critical undersea cables without leaving any fingerprints. A joint operation involving Britain, Norway, and the United States tracked and confronted the Russian vessels, which left without completing their exercise.[1]

The cables in question are no thicker than a garden hose. They lie on the seabed or are buried just below the surface, some at depths of 2,700 meters. Two 1,400-kilometre subsea fibre-optic cables link Svalbard to mainland Norway, carrying vast amounts of satellite data downloaded at the SvalSat satellite ground station, the world's largest and part of NASA's Near Space Network.[2]

Britain and Norway disclosed in April that they had uncovered a covert Russian operation in Arctic waters. But the discovery of the new weapon, the location of the operation, and the US involvement have not previously been reported. The clandestine operation was carried out by Moscow's undersea warfare directorate, which used deep-sea submersibles to simulate the deployment of the technology. Western officials declined to detail how the weapon works.[3]

Some US intelligence analysts are increasingly concerned Russia may test NATO's mutual defence pact, known as Article 5. If it does, destroying subsea cables could be a critical part of that effort. The cables are the backbone of global internet connectivity and financial transactions. Their economic and strategic importance has made them targets in past conflicts, including both World Wars, when they were critical to delivering orders by telegraph or telephone.

The confrontation in Arctic waters is part of a broader pattern. Ships sailing slowly over or near sensitive subsea infrastructure, an activity known as "drifting," rose 52 percent in the North Sea in 2025, with 13,079 vessels recorded. In the South China Sea, drifting activity jumped 88 percent to 18,401 vessels. It is not illegal to survey infrastructure in international waters, but security experts see such extensive mapping as preparation for sabotage.[4]

At least 11 subsea cables were damaged or cut in the Baltic Sea from October 2023 through the end of 2025. The activity prompted new initiatives including NATO's Baltic Sentry monitoring system and the UK-led Nordic Warden, bringing navies together for increased patrols of critical infrastructure.[5]

In August, CIA director John Ratcliffe visited intelligence counterparts in Moscow to warn Russia against escalating sabotage operations in Europe. At the same time, British and Norwegian officials took their findings to Moscow to show they were aware of the new technology, hoping it might make Russia hesitate to use it.[6]

Russia did not damage any cables during the exercise. The operation focused on simulating the deployment of the technology in the event of a conflict with NATO. The Kremlin consistently denies conducting sabotage operations in NATO countries or plotting any confrontation. Russia's defence ministry did not respond to a request for comment.

The cables are growing in number each year, driven by increasing demand for data and electricity, partly from artificial intelligence. Europe remains vulnerable. Bruce Jones, a senior fellow with the Brookings Institution, put it plainly: "In the last 25 years, Europe did two things simultaneously. It dramatically expanded the extent to which it relies on seabed infrastructure, and it dramatically shrunk its capacity to protect that infrastructure. It's belatedly rebuilding now, in the face of a burgeoning Russian threat."[7]

The entire global internet, the financial system that moves trillions of dollars across borders, the satellite data that feeds weather forecasts and military intelligence, all of it runs through cables no thicker than a garden hose, lying in the dark at the bottom of the ocean. Russia is training to cut them. NATO is training to stop it. The seabed is now a battlefield.